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Introduction
The aim of this dissertation is the realization of mathematical models on
tax evasion, more and more comprehensive and complex, from the (microe-
conomic) point of view of a taxpayer. In particular, we begin with a static
model on tax evasion and confidence in institutions (that extends a classi-
cal model with maximization of expected utility), then we transform it in
a model on the taxpayer’s expectations (using stochastic variables and pro-
cesses), finally we extend it to a stochastic control model with (public and
private) investments.
The first model that we propose describes, in a static framework with
maximization of expected well-being, the citizen’s choice on declared income,
taking into account his or her confidence in institutions and his or her sense
of social responsibility.
The use of an economic model to describe the violation of the law, was
proposed by Becker (1968). Along this line Allingham and Sandmo wrote a
seminal paper on tax evasion (1972), modeling the fiscal choice as a gamble, in
a microeconomic framework of expected utility maximization. But it is well
known that the taxpayer’s behavior is also driven by social, psychological and
economic factors (among which, the trust in institutions) related to the tax
morale (see Torgler, 2003). Furthermore, as it is clear in the detailed analysis
of Rose-Ackerman (2004), the different causes of corruption in general, and
the various possible ways to reduce tax evasion in particular, make taxes an
economic topic characterized by a significant degree of complexity.
The second model that we propose, describes the taxpayer’s expectations
on the economic determinants of the fiscal choice and on his or her fiscal
behavior in the future (it can be also seen as a forecasting model), both in
discrete-time and in continuous-time, with the use of random variables and
Monte Carlo methods.
Indeed, in the complex context of tax evasion, the taxpayer’s expectations
play a significant role (for example, in the policies oriented to raise tax com-
pliance, or in the effect that a change of tax rate has in macroeconomic
variables such as consumption, savings and investments). The importance
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of expectations in determining economic choices was already emphasized
by Keynes (1936) and it is possible to find in the literature different ways
to model them. For instance adaptive expectations (described by Nerlove,
1958), that use the present and past information to forecast the future value
of an economic variable (for example, a price). Or rational expectations
(proposed by Muth, 1961, and used by Lucas in a general equilibrium model,
1972), that use the whole information provided by the model to forecast the
expected value of a variable.
The third model that we propose concerns the taxpayer’s expectations
taking into account dynamical factors as public and private investments,
within a stochastic control model.
The use of stochastic control models in economics began some decades ago
(see, for instance, Bismut, 1975, and Merton, 1975). These models combine
the instruments of stochastic calculus with those of deterministic control, in
order to describe a controlled dynamical system under assumptions of uncer-
tainty. In particular, stochastic control models allow to study the dynamics
of (stochastic) state processes (describing, for example, the accumulation of
income, capital or public expenditure), depending on (stochastic) control pro-
cesses (describing, for example, consumption, savings or investments) that
the economic agent chooses in order to maximize the (expected) total utility
in a time interval.
In Chapter 1 we propose the static model on tax evasion with confidence
in institutions. Chapter 2 deals with the model on taxpayer’s expectations,
both in discrete-time and in continuous-time. In Chapter 3 we present the
stochastic control model on taxpayer’s expectations with public and private
investments. Then, there are the conclusions of the dissertation. Appendix A
offers some specifications on technical and mathematical properties. In Ap-
pendix B there is a project of empirical verification for the assumptions of the
static model. Appendix C introduces the code (contained in the attachments
1 and 2) of an algorithm used in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 1
Static model
In this chapter we present a theoretical model of tax evasion, which takes into
account the confidence of the taxpayer in respect of institutions and his or
her sense of social responsibility. In order to do this, in addition to the utility
of income, is attributed to the agent a utility (‘confidence’) of contributing
to the collective welfare. Confidence is a function of declared income, tax
rate and effectiveness of public expenditure.
The seminal model on tax evasion proposed by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) treats the choice of evading as a gamble. A citizen is called to pay taxes
on his or her income W , at a fixed rate θ. If the citizen declares less than his
or her income (i.e. he or she declares an amount X < W ), it is assumed that
he or she can be recognized as evader with a certain (perceived) probability
p. In such case, the evader has to pay taxes on the concealed income W −X
at a penalty rate pi, which is higher than the tax rate (i.e. he or she has
to pay, overall, θX + pi(W − X) ). Taxpayer’s marginal income utility is
assumed to be positive and decreasing. Furthermore, the taxpayer chooses
the declared income X so as to maximize the expected (with respect to the
probability of being discovered) utility.
Yitzhaki (1974) modifies the model of Allingham and Sandmo applying a
fine proportional to the evaded tax (rather than to the undeclared income).
Namely, the discovered evader has to pay, overall, θX+fθ(W−X), with f >
1. In this way, the model fits to a widespread tax system. In the following,
we denote the model of Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki as the ‘classical model’.
The classical model does not take into account the factors that make
evasion different from a gamble. They are due to social and psychological
motivations and are also connected with functioning of services and confi-
dence in institutions (on various aspects of the tax morale see, for instance,
the work of Torgler, 2003). Allingham and Sandmo themselves mention the
possibility of using a more extensive form of utility, which takes into account
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a (binary type) variable of reputation as a citizen. However, they focus their
analysis simply on the utility of income. These social, psychological and
structural factors explain, among other things, the cases in which tax com-
pliance is chosen despite an apparently convenient gamble. Moreover, in the
classical model, if one assumes that the absolute risk aversion is decreasing
with income, compliance increases as tax rate increases. But this relation-
ship, as well as being counterintuitive, is contradicted by empirical studies
in this regard (see, for instance, the work of Clotfelter, 1983, and that of
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996). A comprehensive review of the
literature on the empirical evidences in contrast to the classical model may
be found in the introduction of the work of Myles and Naylor (1996) and in
the survey of Freire-Seren and Panades (2013).
Various theoretical models have been developed to solve these contrasts.
Cowell and Gordon (1988) propose a model in which utility depends (as well
as on consumption) on public goods. Gordon (1989) proposes a model in
which, to the utility of consumption, is added a (linear) term which decreases
as hidden income increases. This added term can be interpreted as a psychic
cost of evasion. The model of Bordignon (1993) includes a fairness constraint,
which constitutes a ceiling on evasion. The fairness constraint depends on
tax rate, public goods and behavior of the other citizens. The model of
Myles and Naylor (1996) distinguishes the utility of evading (analogous to
that in the classical model) from the utility of not evading (that takes into
account income, social customs and behavior of the other citizens). Tax
evasion occurs when the utility of evading is greater than the utility of not
evading. In the model of Sour (2004), which is inspired by the models of
Gordon (1989) and Myles and Naylor (1996), the utility function takes into
account (besides income) psychic cost of evasion and behavior of the other
citizens. Other models that in the utility function consider social norms and
presence of the other citizens, are proposed by Kim (2003), Fortin, Lacroix,
Villeval (2007), Dell’Anno (2009) and Traxler (2010).
In our model we assume the same hypotheses for the tax system made
in the classical model. But unlike the classical model, the taxpayer chooses
the declared income X so as to maximize the expected (with respect to the
probability of being discovered p) ‘well-being function’ B, of the form
B = U + C ,
where U is the classical utility of income and C is the ‘confidence function’
(a utility of contributing to the collective welfare).
For the use of the concept of well-being in the economical literature, see the
survey of Stutzer and Frey (2010). For the statistical linkage between the
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tax compliance attitude and the subjective well-being, see Helliwell (2003).
A well-being function in which there are an addend concerning the economic
utility and one for the moral utility, is proposed in the work of Parada Daza
(2004). Well-being in our model can be considered a generalization of the
utility in Gordon (1989), with the difference that the dependence on the hid-
den income may be non-linear (and with tax rate and effectiveness of public
expenditure, not present in the form of the utility considered in Gordon
(1989) ). The confidence function can be interpreted as the social responsi-
bility of the individual, or his or her confidence in institutions. This function
depends, as well as on the declared income X, on the tax rate θ and on the
perceived effectiveness of public expenditure α. For the role of trust in insti-
tutions in tax morale, see the works of Torgler (2003), Nabaweesi, Ngoboka,
Nakku (2013), Birskyte (2014). For the use of the government effectiveness
as an argument of the utility function, see Dell’Anno (2009).
In this chapter we show that, unlike the classical model, there are citizens
who choose tax compliance even in case of convenient gamble. Moreover, in
our model an increase in tax rate may lead to an increase in tax evasion.
In regard to these issues, therefore, this model proposes a solution to the
conflicts between the results of the classical model and the empirical findings.
Furthermore, tax compliance is monotonically non-decreasing with respect
to the effectiveness of public expenditure. This result is consistent with the
econometric analysis of Schneider, Buehn, Montenegro (2010).
Within our model we can also describe different types of taxpayers, as
the free rider, the honest citizen, the taxpayer sensitive to the effectiveness
of public expenditure and the taxpayer sensitive to the tax rate. We offer an
example in this regard.
In Section 1.1, our model is conceptually described and mathematically
formalized. Section 1.2 deals with the analysis of the model. Section 1.3 offers
some examples. In Section 1.4 there are the conclusions of this chapter.
1.1 The model
Let us imagine that a citizen with (positive) income W is called to pay taxes,
at a (fixed) rate equal to θ, with 0 < θ < 1.
If the citizen declares his or her entire income, therefore, he or she pays a tax
equal to θW . In case the citizen declares an amount X < W , it is assumed
that he or she can be recognized as evader with (perceived) probability equal
to p (with 0 < p < 1).
In such case, the evader has to pay a fine f > 1 on the evaded tax θ(W −X),
i.e. he or she has to pay fθ(W −X). For technical reasons, namely to avoid
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dealing with the utility of negative amounts, we put a ceiling on the fine,
assuming f < 1
θ
(see in this regard Appendix A.1). The latter hypothesis
does not remove the interest of the model. For example, it is consistent with
tax systems characterized by frequent checks and fines not too high.
According to our assumptions, the undiscovered evader ends up with an
effective income Y equal to
Y = W − θX . (1.1)
The discovered evader, instead, ends up with an effective income Z equal to
Z = W − θX − fθ(W −X) . (1.2)
As yet, our model follows the model of Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ex-
cept for the ceiling on the fine, not present in the classical model). Now,
rather than limit ourselves to consider the utility of income (classical model),
we assume that the citizen has his or her own ‘well-being function’ B of the
form
B(y1, y2, θ, α) = U(y1) + C(y2, θ, α) ,
where y1 ∈]0,∞[ is the effective income, y2 ∈]0,∞[ is the declared income,
α ∈]0, 1[ is a parameter of (perceived) efficacy of public expenditure, the
(real-valued) functions U and C are, respectively, the classical utility of in-
come and the ‘confidence’ (a utility of contributing to the collective welfare).
In this way we are modeling the fact that choices in terms of tax compliance
are not a simple gamble (in which who evade wins if he or she is not discovered
and loses otherwise), as in the classical model. They are also linked to the
confidence of the citizen in respect of institutions and his or her sense of
social responsibility and, in this way, to the well-being of the citizen (and
therefore to social and psychological factors and to functioning of services).
The parameter α is subjective, since it refers to perceived effectiveness.
It can be seen how a perception of quality of public services or policies (or
even, for example, of control of corruption). One can obtain an indicator
of α by statistical methods, such as in (Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi, 2010).
The parameter α may also be interpreted as a perception of equity, or of
distributive efficiency (for example, Pareto efficiency).
We assume that U has continuous second order derivative. We also as-
sume that C has continuous second order derivatives with respect to all
variables.
Implicitly, we can define C(0, θ, α) and Cy2(0, θ, α) as limits (eventually not
finished) for y2 that tends to 0 from the right.
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In order to have U increasing and strictly concave (risk aversion), we assume
for all y1
U ′(y1) > 0 ,
U ′′(y1) < 0 .
For C, with respect to the declared income, it is reasonable assuming similar
hypotheses (admitting also the cases with Cy2 and Cy2y2 equal to 0). Then,
for all y2, θ, α we have
Cy2(y2, θ, α) ≥ 0 ,
Cy2y2(y2, θ, α) ≤ 0 .
We also assume that there exists θ ∈ [0, 1
f
[ such that for all θ > θ (and for
all y2, α) we have
Cy2θ(y2, θ, α) ≤ 0 ,
namely, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-
increasing with respect to θ, at least above θ. This assumption appears
reasonable, because we imagine that if taxes seem too high, citizens lose con-
fidence in institutions and are less motivated to give their fiscal contribution.
Furthermore, we assume that for all y2, θ, α we have
Cy2α(y2, θ, α) ≥ 0 ,
that is, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-
decreasing with respect to α. Also this assumption appears reasonable, be-
cause we imagine that if public expenditure is perceived as effective, the
citizen acquires confidence in institutions and he or she is more motivated to
give his or her fiscal contribution to the welfare of the community.
Notice that the classical model may be seen as a particular case of our model,
for C identically zero (and, in general, for C constant with respect to y2,
because in these cases the marginal confidence Cy2 is identically zero).
1.2 Analysis and solution of the model
The expected well-being of a citizen who chooses to declare X is therefore
equal to
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E[B] = (1− p)B(W − θX,X, θ, α) + pB(W − θX − fθ(W −X), X, θ, α)
= (1− p)U(W − θX) + pU(W − θX − fθ(W −X) ) + C(X, θ, α) .
We assume that the citizen declares an amount X that maximizes the ex-
pected well-being.
In case X is an interior maximum of [0,W ], it has to satisfy the following
first order condition
∂E[B]
∂X
= 0 ,
that is
−θ(1−p)U ′(W−θX)−(θ−fθ)pU ′(W−θX−fθ(W−X) )+Cy2(X, θ, α) = 0 ,
(1.3)
that is
−θ(1− p)U ′(Y ) + θ(f − 1)pU ′(Z) + Cy2(X, θ, α) = 0 , (1.4)
where Y and Z are defined, respectively, in (1.1) and (1.2).
The second order condition (sufficient for a relative interior maximum, once
verified that of the first order) is given by
∂2E[B]
∂X2
< 0 ,
that is
θ2(1− p)U ′′(Y ) + θ2(1− f)2pU ′′(Z) + Cy2y2(X, θ, α) < 0 . (1.5)
This condition, thanks to the assumptions on U and C, is verified for each
X ∈]0,W [. It implies that ∂E[B]
∂X
is decreasing with respect to X. Then ∂E[B]
∂X
is null at a (unique) interior point of [0,W ] if and only if both the following
conditions are verified
∂E[B]
∂X
|X=0 > 0 , (1.6)
∂E[B]
∂X
|X=W < 0 . (1.7)
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Therefore these constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a (unique) interior point X of absolute maximum (figure 1.1, case
1 ).
If condition (1.6) is false, instead, the expected well-being is maximized for
X = 0 (because ∂E[B]
∂X
< 0 in ]0,W [ and, thus, E[B] is decreasing) (figure 1.1,
case 2 ). If condition (1.7) is false, the expected well-being is maximized for
X = W (because ∂E[B]
∂X
> 0 in ]0,W [ and, thus, E[B] is increasing) (figure
1.1, case 3 ).
0
case 1
case 2
case 3
W
Expected well -being
Figure 1.1: The expected well-being as a function of X.
Condition (1.6) may be explicitly written as follows (consider the left-hand
side of (1.3) for X = 0)
−θ(1− p)U ′(W )− (θ − fθ)pU ′(W − fθW ) + Cy2(0, θ, α) > 0 ,
that is equivalent (dividing by −θU ′(W − fθW ) ) to
(1− p) U
′(W )
U ′(W − fθW ) − (f − 1)p−
Cy2(0, θ, α)
θU ′(W − fθW ) < 0 ,
that is
U ′(W )
U ′(W (1− fθ) ) <
p(f − 1)
1− p +
Cy2(0, θ, α)
θU ′(W (1− fθ) )(1− p) . (1.8)
Condition (1.7) may be explicitly written as follows (consider the left-hand
side of (1.3) for X = W )
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−θ(1− p)U ′(W − θW )− (θ − fθ)pU ′(W − θW ) + Cy2(W, θ, α) < 0 ,
that is equivalent to
−θU ′(W − θW )[1− p+ (1− f)p] + Cy2(W, θ, α) < 0 ,
that is
[1− p+ p− pf ]− Cy2(W, θ, α)
θU ′(W − θW ) > 0 ,
that is equivalent to
pf < 1− Cy2(W, θ, α)
θU ′(W (1− θ) ) . (1.9)
In the classical model of Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki, instead, the two con-
ditions (1.8), (1.9) (obtained simply maximizing E[U ]) may be explicitly
written, respectively, as
U ′(W )
U ′(W (1− fθ) ) <
p(f − 1)
1− p ,
and
pf < 1 .
Comparing the conditions of our model with those of the classical model, we
realize that condition (1.8) is weaker than the first classical condition, while
(1.9) is stronger than the second classical condition. Thus if null income is
declared in our model, namely condition (1.8) is false, then the first classical
condition is even false and therefore also in the classical model null income
is declared.
On the other hand, if the entire income is declared in the classical model,
namely the second classical condition is false, then condition (1.9) is even
false and therefore also in our model the entire income is declared. In the
following there is an example (see Section 1.3, Example 1) in which in our
model the entire income is declared, whereas in the classical model there is
tax evasion.
Now we examine how the parameter θ affects the interior point of absolute
maximum.
Let X(θ) be the solution of the first order condition (1.4), or (equivalently)
of
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(1− p)U ′(Y )− (f − 1)pU ′(Z)− Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ
= 0 . (1.10)
Varying θ (and the relative X(θ) ) in a suitable neighborhood, condition
(1.10) remains verified (for details see Appendix A.2) and the left-hand side
of (1.10) is a constant function (equal to 0) of θ, thus it has null derivative
with respect to θ. On the basis of this property, differentiating the left-hand
side of (1.10) respect to θ and setting
Y = W − θX ,
Z = W − θX − fθ(W −X) ,
we obtain
(1−p)
(
−X−θ∂X
∂θ
)
U ′′(Y )+(1−f)p
(
−X−θ∂X
∂θ
−f(W−X)+fθ∂X
∂θ
)
U ′′(Z)
+
1
θ2
[
− θ
(
Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
∂X
∂θ
+ Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
)
+ Cy2(X, θ, α)
]
= 0
(for the existence of ∂X
∂θ
see Appendix A.2), that is equivalent to
∂X
∂θ
=
−θ
D
[
X
(
(1− p)U ′′(Y )− p(f − 1)U ′′(Z)
)
− pf(f − 1)(W −X)U ′′(Z)+
+
Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
θ
− Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
]
(1.11)
(for the complete proof see Appendix A.2) where D is the left-hand side of
the second order condition (1.5) evaluated at X, that is
D = θ2(1− p)U ′′(Y ) + θ2p(f − 1)2U ′′(Z) + Cy2y2(X, θ, α) .
Notice that the form of ∂X
∂θ
in the classical model of Allingham-Sandmo-
Yitzhaki is the one reported in the first line of equation (1.11). Assuming
that the absolute risk aversion (RA(y1) = −U ′′(y1)U ′(y1) ) is decreasing with income,
one has ∂X
∂θ
> 0 (see Yitzhaki, 1974, p.202), in contrast to the empirical
results. In our case, the terms of the first line of equation (1.11) may assume
values different than in the classical model, and the terms in the second line
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of equation (1.11) are negative or null (at least for θ > θ). For these reasons,
in our model ∂X
∂θ
can take negative values, consistently with the empirical
results. In the following there is an example (see Section 1.3, Example 2) in
this regard.
Already in (Gordon, 1989) the addition of a psychic cost changes the classical
result (at the end of Example 2 it is shown as the utility of Gordon is a special
case of our well-being function).
Let us analyze now the sensitivity with respect to the effectiveness of
public expenditure (proceeding as before).
Differentiating the first member of (1.10) with respect to α (and setting null
the derivative) we obtain
(1− p)
(
− θ∂X
∂α
)
U ′′(Y )− (f − 1)p
(
− θ∂X
∂α
+ fθ
∂X
∂α
)
U ′′(Z)
−
(
Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
∂X
∂α
+ Cy2α(X, θ, α)
)
θ
= 0 ,
that is
∂X
∂α
(
− θ(1−p)U ′′(Y )− θp(f −1)2U ′′(Z)− Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
θ
)
=
Cy2α(X, θ, α)
θ
,
that is equivalent to
∂X
∂α
= −Cy2α(X, θ, α)
D
.
Therefore, as it was reasonably expected, it is always
∂X
∂α
≥ 0
(namely, tax compliance is monotonically non-decreasing with respect to the
effectiveness of public expenditure).
This result is consistent with the econometric analysis of Schneider, Buehn,
Montenegro (2010), where within a MIMIC model it occurs a negative re-
lationship between the government effectiveness and the shadow economy
(that can be a proxy of tax evasion).
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1.3 A few examples
Example 1.
Let us see now an example in which in our model the entire income is declared,
whereas in the classical model there is tax evasion. In this way, our model is
consistent with the fact that there are citizens who do not evade despite tax
evasion may arise as an apparently convenient gamble.
Let us consider a utility of income and a confidence function of the form{
U(y1) = ln y1 ,
C(y2, θ, α) =
α
θ
ln y2 .
(1.12)
The assumptions on U and C are, therefore, all verified.
Assigning, in addition, the values
W = 1 , p =
1
5
, f = 3 , θ =
1
5
, α =
1
2
,
it results fθ < 1 (the assumption about f is verified). Moreover pf < 1,
namely, as we have seen previously, in the classical model there is tax evasion.
Let us remember that condition (1.7) is explicitly written in condition (1.9)
pf < 1− Cy2(W, θ, α)
θU ′(W (1− θ) )
and, by using (1.12), it becomes
pf < 1−
α
θW
θ
W (1−θ)
,
that is
pf < 1− α(1− θ)
θ2
.
Since
1− α(1− θ)
θ2
= −9 ≤ 3
5
= pf ,
condition (1.7) is not verified and therefore, for this configuration of functions
and parameters, in our model the entire income is declared.
Example 2.
As we have seen previously, in the classical model if the citizen has abso-
lute risk aversion decreasing with income, then ∂X
∂θ
> 0, in contrast to the
empirical studies.
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Let us see now an example in which, instead, in our model a citizen has
absolute risk aversion decreasing with income and, for certain values of the
parameters, it is ∂X
∂θ
< 0 (thus, as taxes increase, declared income decreases).
We assume the same utility and confidence functions (1.12) as in the previous
example.
Notice that the absolute risk aversion of U is
RA(y1) = −U
′′(y1)
U ′(y1)
= −
− 1
y21
1
y1
=
1
y1
,
therefore RA(y1) is decreasing with income. We assign the values
W = 1 , p =
1
5
, f = 2 , θ =
9
20
, α =
1
5
.
It results fθ < 1 (the assumption about f is verified). In addition, condition
(1.8) takes the form
1
W
1
W (1−fθ)
<
p(f − 1)
1− p +
limy2→0+
α
θy2
θ(1−p)
W (1−fθ)
,
then it is verified since the left-hand side is finite and limy2→0+
α
θy2
= +∞.
Condition (1.9) takes the form
pf < 1− α(1− θ)
θ2
,
and, for the configuration of parameters considered, it becomes equivalent to
1 <
185
162
.
Then there exists a unique X of interior maximum, obtainable as solution of
the first order condition (in the equivalent form (1.10) )
(1− 1
5
) · 1
1− θX + (1− 2) ·
1
5
· 1
1− θX − 2θ(1−X) +
1
5
θX
· 1−θ = 0 ,
that is equivalent to
4
(
1−θX−2θ(1−X)
)
θ2X−(1−θX)θ2X−(1−θX)
(
1−θX−2θ(1−X)
)
= 0 .
For θ = 9
20
the solution is
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X =
2
585
(117 +
√
26689) .
The sign of the derivative (1.11) coincides with that of the factor
X
(
(1− p)U ′′(Y )− p(f − 1)U ′′(Z)
)
− pf(f − 1)(W −X)U ′′(Z)
+
Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
θ
− Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
,
that is equal to −6.21297 (with numerical calculation), and therefore ∂X
∂θ
< 0.
Gordon (1989) provides another example of ∂X
∂θ
< 0 for a suitable choice
of the parameters. This example may be cast in our setting by choosing a
well-being function of the type
B(y1, y2) = U(y1)− v(W − y2)
where v is a non-negative constant. Notice that the confidence function is,
in this case, indipendent of θ and α.
Figure 1.2 shows the curves of declared income as θ varies in the interval
[0.401, 0.499], in the classical model (lower curve) as well as in our model
(upper curve), with the choice of functions and parameters of Example 2.
We can observe, in particular, that for θ = 9
20
= 0.45 in the classical model
it has positive derivative and in our model negative derivative, as we have
seen in Example 2.
In addition, in the first part of the interval, we note that in our model the
entire income is declared despite in the classical model there is tax evasion
(convenient gamble), as it happens in Example 1 (but with a different choice
of parameters).
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Our model
Classical model
0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48
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0.2
0.4
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1.0
Declared income
Figure 1.2: The declared income as a function of θ.
Example 3.
In this example we describe four types of taxpayers: the free rider, the honest
citizen, the taxpayer sensitive to the effectiveness of public expenditure and
the taxpayer sensitive to the tax rate.
a) The free rider.
Within our model, we can represent the free rider as a taxpayer that, in the
decision on the income to declare, does not take into account his or her social
responsibility. In other words, he or she maximizes the utility of income U ,
while his or her confidence function C is identically zero. In this way, the
choice of the income to declare X matches exactly with that of the classical
model.
To obtain an example of free rider, we assign, as in the previous example,
the values
W = 1 , p =
1
5
, f = 2 , α =
1
5
,
and we assume {
U(y1) = ln y1 ,
C(y2, θ, α) = 0 .
Figure 1.3 shows the values of X, as θ varies in the interval [0.001, 0.499].
Naturally, the curve of the classical model and that of our model are coinci-
dent.
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Our model = Classical model
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Tax rate
0.1
0.2
0.3
Declared income
Figure 1.3: The free rider.
b) The honest citizen.
Within our model, we can represent the honest citizen as a taxpayer that
always chooses to declare the entire income.
In other words, his or her utility function U and his or her confidence function
C are such that X = W , for all W, p, f, θ, α.
To obtain an example of honest citizen, we assume{
U(y1) = ln(1 + y1) ,
C(y2, θ, α) = 2y2 .
In this case, in fact, condition (1.9) becomes
pf < 1− 2
θ 1
1+W (1−θ)
.
In order to show that the condition is false for all choices of the parameters,
it suffices to prove that
2 ≥ θ
1 +W (1− θ) ,
that is true, because θ < 1 and 1 +W (1− θ) > 1.
Figure 1.4, obtained with W = 1, p = 1
5
, f = 2, α = 1
5
, shows the values of
X, as θ varies in the interval [0.001, 0.499]. In this case, in our model we have
X = W , despite in the classical model (where the taxpayer only maximizes
U) we have X = 0 in the whole interval.
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Figure 1.4: The honest citizen.
c) The taxpayer sensitive to α.
Figure 1.5, obtained with{
U(y1) = ln(y1) ,
C(y2, θ, α) =
1
4
α
θ
ln y2 ,
and
W = 1 , p =
1
5
, f = 2 , θ =
9
20
,
shows the values of X, as α varies in the interval [0.001, 0.999].
It describes an example of taxpayer that is sensitive to α, namely a taxpayer
that varies considerably his or her choice on the percentage of declared income
depending on the perceived effectiveness of public expenditure.
In particular, he or she passes from a percentage lower than 30% (as in the
classical model) for α near to 0, to a percentage equal to 100% (very far from
that of the classical model) when α assumes high values.
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0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Effectiveness
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Declared income
Figure 1.5: The taxpayer sensitive to α.
d) The taxpayer sensitive to θ.
Figure 1.6, obtained with{
U(y1) = ln(y1) ,
C(y2, θ, α) =
1
2
α
θ
ln y2 ,
and
W = 1 , p =
1
5
, f = 2 , α =
1
5
,
shows the values of X, as θ varies in the interval [0.001, 0.499].
It describes an example of taxpayer that is sensitive to θ, namely a taxpayer
that varies considerably his or her behavior depending on the tax rate.
In particular, the difference between the declared income in our model and
the one declared in the classical model passes from a percentage equal to
100% for θ near to 0, to a percentage lower than 30% when θ assumes high
values.
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Figure 1.6: The taxpayer sensitive to θ.
1.4 Conclusions of this chapter
In this chapter we extend the classical theoretical models of tax evasion
of Allingham-Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) by introducing the utility
(confidence) of contributing to the collective welfare. In this framework, there
are citizens who choose tax compliance even in case of convenient gamble.
Moreover, we show that an increase in tax rate may lead to an increase in tax
evasion. In regard to these issues, therefore, this model proposes a solution
to the conflicts between the results of the classical model and the empirical
findings. Within our model we can describe different types of taxpayers, as
the free rider, the honest citizen, the taxpayer sensitive to the effectiveness
of public expenditure and the taxpayer sensitive to the tax rate.
Naturally, the model that we have proposed is a simplification of a reality
much more various and complex. It is also affected by the methodological
problems that are common to all models based on the maximization of a form
of expected utility. However, keeping in mind these limitations, it has the
advantage of describing the choice of a taxpayer taking into account aspects
not covered by the classical model, such as the confidence in institutions,
the sense of social responsibility, the (perceived) fairness of tax rate and the
(perceived) effectiveness of public expenditure.
In the Appendix B we propose a verification project for the assumptions of
the model, with econometric and qualitative methods.
Possible extensions of the model may capture other aspects of tax systems
and fiscal choices. For example, the assumption of fixed tax rate may be
replaced by the assumption of progressive taxation. Moreover, the choice of
a taxpayer may be influenced by the choices of other taxpayers.
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In the following, we extend this model in a discrete-time and a continuous-
time frameworks with random variables (Chapter 2) and in a stochastic con-
trol model (Chapter 3), in order to express the taxpayer’s expectations (or,
in an alternative interpretation, to forecast the taxpayer’s behavior).
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Chapter 2
Expectations models
It is known that the actions of economic agents in the present are based, as
well as on the current economic variables, on the values that they expect for
the variables in the future. In this sense, expectations play an important
role in the models that describe the economic processes in a time interval
(dynamical models).
In particular, in the framework of an economic model that takes into account
the income tax, it can be important to understand what are the expectations
of a taxpayer on the income that he or she will declare in the future.
The following describes two models, the first discrete-time (Section 2.1) and
the second continuous-time (Section 2.2), on the expectations of a taxpayer
(or, in an alternative interpretation, forecasting the behavior of a taxpayer).
In other words, these models try to answer the question ‘What are, today,
the expectations of a taxpayer on the part of income that he or she will
declare in the future?’ and questions related to it (for instance, increasing or
decreasing trend of evasion in absolute terms or in proportion to the income).
To answer these questions, the models project into the future (using random
variables and stochastic processes) the static model proposed in Chapter
1 (that extends the classical models in (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) and
(Yitzhaki, 1974), taking into account the confidence of the taxpayer in respect
of institutions and his or her sense of social responsibility).
2.1 The discrete-time model
2.1.1 Case 1: only one choice
Let us consider, in the first instance, the discrete-time model with a single
time interval (model with only one choice). t0 is the ‘time of expectations’
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(or forecasts) and t1 is the ‘time of choice’. For instance, t0 = 0 can represent
the present time and t1 = 1 the time when, after a year, a citizen chooses
the part of income to declare.
Let us imagine, retracing the model in Chapter 1, that the citizen after one
year has a (positive) income W1 and he or she is called to pay taxes at a rate
(independent of income) θ1, with 0 < θ1 < 1. If he or she declares his or her
entire income, therefore, he or she pays a tax of θ1W1. If he or she declares
an amount X1 < W1, he or she can be recognized as evader with (perceived)
probability equal to p1 (with 0 < p1 < 1). In such case, he or she has to
pay a fine f1 > 1 on the evaded tax θ1(W1 −X1), i.e. he or she has to pay
f1θ1(W1−X1) (as in Chapter 1, to avoid dealing with the utility of negative
amounts, we put a ceiling on the fine, assuming f1 <
1
θ1
. See in this regard
Appendix A.1).
We assume, furthermore, that the citizen has its own ‘well-being function’ B
of the form
B(y1, y2, θ, α) = U(y1) + C(y2, θ, α) ,
with the same meaning and hypotheses of the previous chapter.
The citizen, at time t1, declares an amount X1 that maximizes the expected
well-being
E[B] = (1− p1)B(W1 − θ1X1, X1, θ1, α1)+
+p1B(W1 − θ1X1 − f1θ1(W1 −X1), X1, θ1, α1) .
From the analysis conducted in Chapter 1, based on the first and second order
conditions, it results that there exists a (unique) interior point of absolute
maximum, X1 ∈]0,W1[, if and only if both the conditions (1.8), (1.9) are
verified. In addition, the expected well-being is maximized for X1 = 0 (null
declaration) if and only if condition (1.8) is false. The expected well-being
is maximized for X1 = W1 (declaration of the entire income) if and only if
condition (1.9) is false.
Therefore, the choice of declared income is a function of the parame-
ters at time t1. So we can indicate the declared income at time t1 with
X1(W1, θ1, α1, p1, f1).
But at time t0 the citizen, in general, does not know exactly what value the
parameters will assume at time t1. For this reason, at time t0 the parameters
W1 , θ1 , α1 , p1 , f1 can be modeled as random variables for which one can
assume particular distributions.
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The function X1(W1, θ1, α1, p1, f1), therefore, at time t0 is itself a random
variable, representing the citizen’s expectations (or forecasts), at time t0, on
the income that he or she will declare at time t1.
We can, at this point, raise the question of the existence of mean and variance
(and higher order moments) for X1. In particular, the following proposition
provides a sufficient condition in order that X1 has finite mean and finite
variance (to indicate that the mean and the variance refer to the time t0,
they can be indicated by E0(X1) and V ar0(X1) ).
Proposition 1. If W1 has finite mean and finite variance, then X1 also has
finite mean and finite variance.
Proof. As 0 ≤ X1 ≤ W1, we have 0 ≤ E0(X1) ≤ E0(W1), therefore X1 has
finite mean.
Moreover, as 0 ≤ X21 ≤ W 21 , we have 0 ≤ E0(X21) ≤ E0(W 21 ), whence
V ar0(X1) = E0(X
2
1)− (E0(X1) )2 ≤ E0(W 21 )− (E0(X1) )2
= V ar0(W1) + (E0(W1) )
2 − (E0(X1) )2 ,
therefore X1 has finite variance.
In the previous chapter is studied the dependence of the declared income
on the tax rate as well as on the effectiveness of public expenditure, through
the determination of ∂X1
∂θ1
and ∂X1
∂α1
. Now we can ask other questions about the
sensitivity to the characteristics of parameters. For instance, to understand
how uncertainty on the income W1 can determine uncertainty on the declared
income X1, one can study the relationship between V ar0(W1) and V ar0(X1).
Naturally these analyses may be quite complex with respect to the general
properties, but they can become easier if they refer to examples with the
assignment of specific distributions (also using simulations and numerical
algorithms).
In the following we propose some examples, in which we assume particu-
lar distributions for the parameters of the problem. With a Monte Carlo
method the mean of X1, the variance and the histogram of the distribution
are estimated (with the same procedure, also third, fourth and higher-order
moments could be estimated). The main aim of these examples is the expo-
sition of a general procedure (rather than the study of particular cases).
In the first example, the income W1 has lognormal distribution and the other
parameters are modeled as deterministic constants.
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Example 4.
Let us consider a utility of income and a confidence function of the form{
U(y1) = ln y1 ,
C(y2, θ, α) =
α
θ
ln y2 .
(2.1)
For the income W1 we assume a lognormal distribution with parameters
−1
2
ln 6
5
,
√
ln 6
5
(with this choice of parameters, the variable W1 has mean 1
and variance 0.2).
We assume, in addition,
p = 0.15 , f = 1.6 , θ = 0.45 , α = 0.15 .
With a suitable algorithm n values of W1 are simulated, for each of them
the corresponding X1 is calculated (as a solution of the related optimization
problem), and the arithmetic mean of these values
M =
∑n
j=1X1j
n
is an estimator of E0(X1). For the variance is used the unbiased estimator
S2 =
(
∑n
j=1X
2
1j
)− nM2
n− 1 .
By using the central limit theorem and the properties of the standard normal
distribution, it can be proved that with n simulations the random error is
proportional to 1√
n
and
I =
[
M − 1.96
√
S2
n
,M + 1.96
√
S2
n
]
is an approximate confidence interval for E0(X1), at the level of 95%. The
algorithm produces also a histogram of the values X1j .
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations, it was obtained
M = 0.700789 , S2 = 0.0976865 , I = [0.694663, 0.706915] ,
with histogram in figure 2.1.
The economic meaning is that the taxpayer expects that after a year he or
she will declare an income M , with an uncertainty expressed by the variance
S2 and by the histogram.
We can observe that the estimated variance for X1 is of the same order (about
half) of the variance of W1. In addition, the (deterministic) value of X1 in
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Figure 2.1: Estimated distribution of X1.
correspondence with W1 = 1 (namely, for W1 equal to its mean) is 0.703794.
We can notice that this value is rather close to M , so as to belong to the
confidence interval.
It should be recalled that the algorithms of this type, being based on the
simulation of random variables, produce different results at each execution.
For a more detailed study of a problem, therefore, the algorithm should be
run several times, each time using a large number of simulations.
In the following example we proceed in a similar way, but this time as-
signing distributions of random variable also to the parameters p, f , α.
Example 5.
In this example we assume the same utility of income and confidence function
(2.1) as in the previous example. Also for the income W1 we assume the same
distribution as in the previous example (lognormal with mean 1 and variance
0.2). We assume, in addition, θ = 0.45.
But this time the parameters p, f , α are random variables with the following
discrete distributions {
p = 0.1 with probability 1
2
,
p = 0.2 with probability 1
2
,{
f = 1.2 with probability 1
2
,
f = 2 with probability 1
2
,{
α = 0.1 with probability 1
2
,
α = 0.2 with probability 1
2
.
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The algorithm is similar to that of the previous example, but this time are
simulated n values of the random vector (W1, p, f, α).
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations, it was obtained (with the
same notations of Example 4)
M = 0.699892 , S2 = 0.132088 , I = [0.692769, 0.707016] ,
with histogram in figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Estimated distribution of X1.
The interpretation, as before, is that the taxpayer expects that after a year
he or she will declare an income M , with an uncertainty expressed by the
variance S2 and by the histogram.
We can observe that the estimated variance for X1 is greater than in the
previous example, and this should be due to the fact that the uncertainty
now, as well as on the income, is also on the probability of being discovered,
the fine and the effectiveness of public expenditure.
In this case, the (deterministic) value of X1 in correspondence with the mean
values W1 = 1, p = 0.15, f = 1.6, α = 0.15, is X1 = 0.703794. As in
the previous example, it results rather close to M , so as to belong to the
confidence interval.
Until now for simplicity we have not considered inflation. However, even
assuming that the citizen keeps the same utility function over time, it is
calibrated to a certain unit of measure. In other words it is reasonable that,
if there is inflation, the marginal utility of a unit of money at time t0 is
different than that at time t1.
For instance, let us assume that the value (adjusted for inflation) at time
t0 of a monetary amount v1, received at time t1, is v0 = v1e
−β1(t1−t0) (with
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β1 > 0 in case of inflation, β1 = 0 in case of constant prices, β1 < 0 in
case of deflation. Eventually modeled as a random variable). Under this
assumption, the expected well-being to maximize takes the form
E[B] = (1− p1)B
(
e−β1(t1−t0)(W1 − θ1X1), e−β1(t1−t0)X1, θ1, α1
)
+
+p1B
(
e−β1(t1−t0)(W1 − θ1X1 − f1θ1(W1 −X1) ), e−β1(t1−t0)X1, θ1, α1
)
.
The problem of existence and uniqueness of solution could be studied under
this new assumption.
The following example is similar to Example 4, but this time we consider the
presence of inflation (modeled with a random variable).
Example 6.
In this example we assume the same utility of income and confidence func-
tion (2.1) as in Example 4 and the same values for the parameters p, f , θ,
α. For the income W1 we assume a lognormal distribution with mean 1.1
and variance 0.2 (the corresponding parameters of distribution are ln 11
10
−
1
2
ln(1
5
e−2 ln
11
10 + 1),
√
ln(1
5
e−2 ln
11
10 + 1) ). We assume, in addition, t0 = 0,
t1 = 1, and for the variable e
β1 we assume the following discrete probability
distribution: {
eβ1 = 1.05 with probability 1
2
,
eβ1 = 1.15 with probability 1
2
,
(to which corresponds a discrete distribution for β1). The algorithm is similar
to that of Example 4, but this time are simulated n values of the random
vector (W1, e
β1).
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations, it was obtained (with the
same notations of the previous examples)
M = 0.778131 , S2 = 0.101089 , I = [0.771899, 0.784362] ,
with histogram in figure 2.3.
The interpretation, as before, is that the taxpayer expects that after a year
he or she will declare an income M , with an uncertainty expressed by the
variance S2 and by the histogram. In this case the uncertainty is due not
only to the income, but also to the two different values that the inflation can
have at time 1.
Moreover, the (deterministic) value of X1 in correspondence with the mean
values W1 = 1.1, e
β1 = 1.1, is X1 = 0.774173. As in the previous examples,
it results rather close to M , so as to belong to the confidence interval.
31
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Figure 2.3: Estimated distribution of X1.
2.1.2 Case 2: n choices
Let us consider now the discrete-time model with n time intervals (model
with n choices). t0 is the ‘time of expectations’ (or forecasts) and t1, . . . , tn
are the ‘times of choices’. For instance, t0 = 0 can represent the present time
and ti = i the time when, after i years, a citizen chooses the part of income
to declare for the year i.
Referring to the same model considered previously, the choice at time ti de-
pends only on the parameters at time ti. In other words, solving for all i the
optimization problem previously considered (for simplicity, without consid-
ering inflation), one obtains the values X i(Wi, θi, αi, pi, fi), each representing
the declared income at time ti (implicitly, we are assuming that the choices in
different times are independent, namely that in every choice the consequences
of the past and the effects in the future can be neglected).
The total declared income in the n years is, therefore, XTot =
∑n
i=1X i.
But at time t0 the citizen, in general, does not know exactly what value
the parameters will assume at the times ti. For this reason, at time t0 the
parameters Wi, θi, αi, pi, fi can be modeled as random variables for which
one can assume particular distributions.
XTot, therefore, at time t0 is itself a random variable (function of the random
variables corresponding to the various parameters in the different times) and
it represents the citizen’s expectations (or forecasts), at time t0, on the total
income that he or she will declare.
The following proposition provides a sufficient condition in order that XTot
has finite mean E0(XTot) and finite variance V ar0(XTot) (the proof is anal-
ogous to that of Proposition 1).
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Proposition 2. If the random variable WTot =
∑n
i=1Wi has finite mean and
finite variance, then XTot also has finite mean and finite variance.
We can also ask various questions about the sensitivity of XTot respect
to the characteristics of parameters. For instance, to understand how un-
certainty on parameters affects uncertainty on XTot, one can study the rela-
tionship between the variances of the parameters and V ar0(XTot). Also in
this case, we can investigate these questions assuming specific distributions
for the parameters (also using simulations and numerical algorithms).
In the following example we consider 5 time intervals (that can be interpreted
as 5 years), assuming a lognormal distribution for the income (with mean and
variance that are constant over time).
Example 7.
We are in the same setting of Example 4, but now we consider 5 time intervals.
The algorithm is similar to that of the previous examples, but this time are
simulated n values of the random vector (W1,W2,W3,W4,W5), and for each
of them it determines the corresponding XTot (as sum of the Xi). As before,
it estimates the mean of XTot, the variance and a confidence interval at the
level of 95%, and it produces a histogram of the values XTotj .
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations, it was obtained (with the
same notations of the previous examples)
M = 3.52116 , S2 = 0.499523 , I = [3.5073, 3.53501] ,
with histogram in figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated distribution of XTot.
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The interpretation is that the taxpayer expects that in the next 5 years he
or she will declare a total income M , with an uncertainty expressed by the
variance S2 and by the histogram.
In this case, the (deterministic) value of XTot in correspondence with the
mean values Wi = 1 is 3.51897. As in the previous examples, it results
rather close to M , so as to belong to the confidence interval.
Other examples might be obtained using, for W , different distributions at
different times (for instance, lognormal with mean that increases over time)
and varying over time the parameters p, f , θ, α (as deterministic or random
variables).
2.2 The continuous-time model
Let us consider, now, the continuous-time model. t0 is the ‘time of expec-
tations’ (or forecasts) and t ∈]t0, t1] are the ‘times of choices’. For instance,
t0 = 0 can represent the present time, t1 = 1 the instant after a year. A pos-
sible interpretation is that a taxpayer (for instance, a dealer), in continuous
time, chooses whether to provide (or not) a receipt and the correspondent
amount.
Let us imagine (adapting to continuous time the previous model) that the
citizen in the infinitesimal time interval [t−dt, t] (with t ∈]t0, t1]) has a (pos-
itive) income wtdt and he or she is called to pay taxes at a rate (independent
of income) θt, with 0 < θt < 1.
If he or she declares xt < wt (that is, xtdt represents the declared income in
the infinitesimal interval [t − dt, t]), he or she can be recognized as evader
with (perceived) probability equal to pt (with 0 < pt < 1).
In such case, he or she has to pay a fine ft > 1 on the evaded tax θt(wt−xt)dt,
i.e. he or she has to pay ftθt(wt− xt)dt (as before, to avoid dealing with the
utility of negative amounts we put a ceiling on the fine, assuming ft <
1
θt
).
According to our assumptions, therefore, the citizen ends up with an effective
income (in the infinitesimal interval [t− dt, t]) equal to ytdt, with
yt = wt − θtxt
if he or she is not discovered, and
yt = wt − θtxt − ftθt(wt − xt)
if he or she is discovered.
We assume, furthermore, that the citizen has its own ‘well-being function’ B
of the form
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B(yt, xt, θt, αt) = U(yt) + C(xt, θt, αt) ,
for which we assume the same hypotheses of the discrete-time case.
The expected well-being of a citizen who at the instant t chooses to declare
xtdt is, therefore, equal to
F (wt, xt, pt, ft, θt, αt)
= (1− pt)B(wt − θtxt, xt, θt, αt) + ptB(wt − θtxt − ftθt(wt − xt), xt, θt, αt)
= (1− pt)U(wt − θtxt) + ptU(wt − θtxt − ftθt(wt − xt) ) + C(xt, θt, αt) .
We assume that the citizen, at time t, declares an amount xtdt that maximizes
the expected well-being.
As in the discrete-time case, using the analysis in Chapter 1 one obtains
conditions analogous to (1.8) and (1.9) which characterize the existence of
internal solutions xt ∈]0, wt[ and the cases xt = 0 and xt = wt.
The choice of declared income is, therefore, a function of the param-
eters at time t. So we can indicate the declared income at time t with
xt(wt, θt, αt, pt, ft)dt.
Let us observe that, though we are dealing with a (continuous-time) dynami-
cal model, the assumption that the choice is only a function of the parameters
at time t allows us to bring back to the static case in Chapter 1.
The total declared income in the time interval ]t0, t1] is therefore (under
suitable regularity hypotheses) XTot =
∫ 1
0
xtdt.
But as in the discrete-time case, at time t0 the citizen, in general, does not
know exactly what value the parameters will assume at the times t ∈]0, 1].
For this reason, at time t0 the parameters wt, θt, αt, pt, ft can be modeled
as random variables for which one can assume particular distributions.
XTot, therefore, at time t0 is itself a random variable (function of the random
variables corresponding to the various parameters in the different times) and
it represents the citizen’s expectations (or forecasts), at time t0, on the total
income that he or she will declare.
The following proposition provides a sufficient condition in order that XTot
has finite mean E0(XTot) and finite variance V ar0(XTot) (we assume that the
random variable in the statement,
∫ 1
0
wtdt, is well defined, and this is true
under suitable regularity hypotheses. The proof of the following proposition
is analogous to that of Proposition 1).
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Proposition 3. If the random variable WTot =
∫ 1
0
wtdt has finite mean and
finite variance, then XTot also has finite mean and finite variance.
As in the discrete-time case, we can ask various questions about the
sensitivity of XTot to the characteristics of parameters. For instance one
can study the relationship between the uncertainty of the parameters and
V ar0(XTot). Naturally, also in this case, the analyses may be quite complex
with respect to the general properties, but they can become easier if they
refer to examples with the assignment of specific distributions (also using
simulations and numerical algorithms).
The following example, of theoretical type, describes a continuous-time model,
in which wt follows the stochastic process of geometric Brownian motion, θt
and αt are deterministic straight lines (the model, under these assumptions,
is formalized as a stochastic control problem).
Example 8.
In order to make a first example, in the time interval [0, 1], we consider a
taxpayer with a utility of income U and a confidence function C, and we
assume that his or her income follows a geometric Brownian motion wt with
percentage drift m and percentage volatility σ. We assume, in addition, that
the tax rate θt and the (perceived) effectiveness of public expenditure αt vary
over time as deterministic straight lines, with slope (respectively) mθ, mα,
and that p and f are deterministic constants.
The economic meaning is that the taxpayer expects, for his or her income, an
aleatory behavior (expressed by the geometric Brownian motion). He or she,
furthermore, expects that the tax rate and the effectiveness of public expen-
diture (varying linearly over time) have an uncertainty negligible compared
to that of income, so not to be considered in the model.
In this setting, the model may be formalized (here we do not discuss the an-
alytical hypotheses of regularity) as the following stochastic control problem
(with constraints):
sup
xt (with 0≤xt≤wt)
E0
(∫ 1
0
F (wt, xt, θt, αt)dt
)
,
under the conditions
dwt = mwtdt+ σwtdBt ,
dθt = mθdt ,
dαt = mαdt ,
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with initial values w0, θ0, α0. Bt is a Brownian motion, the coefficients
m, σ, mθ, mα are deterministic constants. E0() represents the mean with
respect to the available information at time 0. To be consistent with the
hypotheses, we assume w0 > 0, 0 < α0 < 1, 0 < α0 + mα < 1, 0 < θ0 <
1
f
,
0 < θ0 +mθ <
1
f
.
It is interesting to observe (heuristically) that the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation (stochastic case with constraints)
supx (with 0≤x≤w)
{
Vt(w, θ, α, t) + Vw(w, θ, α, t)mw + Vθ(w, θ, α, t)mθ
+Vα(w, θ, α, t)mα +
1
2
Vww(w, θ, α, t)σ
2w2 + F (w, x, θ, α)
}
= 0
(with terminal condition V (w, θ, α, 1) = 0, and V value function of the prob-
lem) returns the (static) maximization problem relative to the instant t
sup
x (with 0≤x≤w)
{
F (w, x, θ, α)
}
.
In the next chapter we study (with a rigorous analysis) stochastic control
problems of this type, with additional hypotheses that do not allow to bring
them back to the static case.
The next example is obtained from the previous one, by assigning the
values of the parameters. In this case the problem can be solved numerically,
discretizing the time interval. As in the discrete-time case, the main aim of
this example is the exposition of a general procedure (rather than the study
of a particular case).
Example 9.
In this example we assume the same utility of income and confidence function
(2.1) as in Example 4 and the same values for the parameters p, f (constant
over time). In addition, as in Example 8, we assume that the income follows a
geometric Brownian motion wt in the time interval [0, 1]. Moreover we assign
values to the parameters of the geometric Brownian motion, namely m = 0.2,
σ = 1, w0 = 1. For simplicity, we assume that θt and αt are constant (that
is, with the notations of the previous example, mθ = mα = 0), with the same
values of Example 4.
In the algorithm we discretize the time interval [0, 1] in 10 equally spaced
sub-intervals. We simulate 10 × n random variables with standard normal
distribution and, thus, we generate n discretized paths of the geometric Brow-
nian motion wt. By solving numerically the static optimization problem, we
determine n (discretized) paths of xt. Finally, by means of numerical in-
tegration, for each path of xt we determine the corresponding XTot. As in
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the previous examples, we estimate the mean of XTot, the variance and a
confidence interval at the level of 95%, and we provide a histogram of the
values XTotj .
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations of paths, we get (with the
same notations of the previous examples):
M = 0.77847 , S2 = 0.0455622 , I = [0.774286, 0.782654] ,
with histogram in figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated distribution of XTot.
With regard to the interpretation, M represents the taxpayer’s expectation
on the total income that he or she will declare in a unitary period of time
(for instance, one month), in which he or she will make some choices (for
instance, about receipts). The variance S2 and the histogram describe the
taxpayer’s uncertainty.
The (deterministic) value of XTot in correspondence with wt deterministic
(σ = 0), calculated with numerical integration, is 0.779109. Also in this
case, it results rather close to M , so as to belong to the confidence interval.
Other examples can be obtained modeling wt as another type of stochas-
tic process (for instance, mean reverting jump) and varying over time the
parameters p, f , θ, α (as deterministic or random variables).
We may also take into account the presence of inflation, by maximizing
the expected well-being
F (wt, xt, pt, ft, θt, αt, βt) = (1−pt)B
(
e−βt(t−t0)(wt−θtxt), e−βt(t−t0)xt, θt, αt
)
+
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+ptB
(
e−βt(t−t0)(wt − θtxt − ftθt(wt − xt) ), e−βt(t−t0)xt, θt, αt
)
,
where βt (eventually, modeled as a random variable) determines, as in the
discrete-time case, the inflation rate. New examples could be obtained under
this assumption of inflation.
2.3 Conclusions of this chapter
We have seen two models, the first discrete-time and the second continuous-
time, on the expectations of a taxpayer (or, in an alternative interpretation,
forecasting the behavior of a taxpayer). The models have been described
and studied in their main properties, also some computational examples have
been provided.
A possible development is the use of these models as a part of a general
equilibrium model with taxpayer’s expectations.
In these models the parameters vary over time and they are described by
random variables. However, by construction, at each instant of time the
choice of the taxpayer is brought back to an optimization problem of the
type studied in Chapter 1. In other words, to solve these models one can
refer to a static problem.
In other cases, however, it is useful to consider problems not referable to
the static case. For instance, let us consider the following paradox. Slightly
weakening the hypotheses on the utility U , we consider the case of a taxpayer
with linear utility (that describes risk neutrality) U(y1) = ky1 (with k >
0) and confidence function identically zero C(y2, θ, α) = 0. It is easy to
demonstrate (the problem is studied in detail in the next chapter) that, in
the case pf = 1, all the choices of declared income X ∈ [0,W ] are equivalent
(in other words, there is a paradoxical situation in which the risk neutral
taxpayer, in this case, has no criteria for choosing). In the next chapter this
paradox is solved extending to a dynamical model.
More in general, in the next chapter we study (continuous-time) models
that, in the choices of the taxpayer, take into account public and private
investments. These models are presented as stochastic control problems, not
referable to the static case.
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Chapter 3
Stochastic control model
In this chapter we present a class of stochastic control models, that describe
the expectations of a taxpayer (or, in an alternative interpretation, forecast-
ing the behavior of a taxpayer) on the part of income that he or she will
declare in the future.
In particular we model a taxpayer who takes into account public and private
investments. Indeed, a part of the collective tax revenue is invested by the
public authorities and it raises the future income of the taxpayer, who is
more motivated to tax compliance (indirect effect). Furthermore, a part of
the taxpayer’s effective income is invested by himself or herself, and it raises
his or her future income. Thus, the taxpayer’s compliance decisions take into
account the consequences of the past and the effects in the future, and the
problem is not referable to the static case (unlike the previous chapter).
In the literature there are various (continuous-time) control models with
tax evasion (also taking into account dynamics of investment). See the works
of Lin and Yang (2001) (with the comment of Dzhumashev and Gahra-
manov, 2011), Chen (2003), Dzhumashev (2007), Dzhumashev and Gahra-
manov (2008), Cerqueti and Coppier (2011), Levaggi and Menoncin (2013),
Ce´lime`ne et al. (2014).
Our model has various points in common with the previous literature, such as
a tax system in which the discovered evader has to pay a fine, the declared
income as control process, the presence of public and private investments.
But our model has different assumptions and structure, because we aim
at describing the expectations of a taxpayer, which maximizes (in a time-
interval) his or her expected well-being (sum of the utility of income and
the confidence in institutions, as in the previous chapters). We assume that
the taxpayer’s income follows a stochastic process depending on public and
private investments.
In Section 3.1, the general model is presented. In Section 3.2, the para-
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dox with risk neutrality, that we have seen before, is formalized and solved.
Section 3.3 deals with a class of models for which we study (by means of a
transformation of variables) the analytical properties, and provides a com-
putational example. In Section 3.4 there are the conclusions of this chapter.
3.1 General model
We consider the problem of a taxpayer who has to decide his or her compli-
ance (the process xt) in order to maximize the following functional
E0
(∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
,
where the taxpayer’s income evolves in time according to the stochastic dif-
ferential law
dwt = g(xt, wt)dt+ h(wt)dBt , (3.1)
with initial value w0 > 0. Bt is a Brownian motion, in a probability space
(Ω,F , P ), with augmented natural filtration {Ft} (that is, {Ft} is obtained
adding the negligible events ofF to the σ-algebras of the filtration generated
by the Brownian motion).
E0() is the conditional expectation with respect to the initial value w0.
F (wt, xt) is the expected well-being of the taxpayer, that is
F (wt, xt) = (1− p)U(wt − θxt) + pU(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) ) + C(xt, θ, α) ,
as described in the continuous-time model of Section 2.2. However, this time
we assume that wt follows the stochastic differential law (3.1), namely, the
income has a trend driven by the function g and an uncertainty driven by
the function h.
The interpretation is that the taxpayer expects that in the time interval [0, T ]
he or she will declare a (stochastic) total income XTot =
∫ T
0
xtdt, where xt
(t ∈ [0, T ] ) is the optimal control process of the problem.
As before, the model describes the expectations of the taxpayer on the part
of income that he or she will declare in the future. But now, the taxpayer’s
compliance decision becomes truly dynamical, because the trend function
g depends on xt (that is, the choice at time t determines the trend of the
income in the future). For instance (as we can see in the sections 3 and 4)
the function g can express the effect of investments (public and private) on
the income.
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As before, we assume for the parameters the hypotheses 0 < p < 1, f > 1,
0 < α < 1, 0 < θ < 1
f
. For the functions U , C and their derivatives, we
assume the same hypotheses of Section 1.1. Furthermore, we assume that
the (real) functions g, h are measurable (with respect to the real Borel σ-
algebras).
We assume, also, that the set of admissible control processes is
A =

x(t, ω) : [0, T ]× Ω→ R such that :
1)xt(ω) ismeasurablewith respect toFt andB(R), for all t.
2)There exists aMarkov processw solution of (3.1),
pathwise unique and positive.
3) 0 ≤ xt ≤ wt (in [0, T ]× Ω).
4)E0
( ∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
exists.

.
The value function of the problem takes the form
V (wt, t) = sup
x∈A
Et
(∫ T
t
F (ws, xs)ds
)
(with Et() the conditional expectation with respect to the initial value wt).
3.1.1 Heuristic derivation of the HJB equation
In the following we obtain the HJB equation as an heuristic necessary con-
dition, under suitable conditions of regularity (for a study on the hypotheses
that assure the validity of the HJB equation, see Krylov, 1980).
We can write Bellman’s principle (for 0 ≤ h ≤ T − t) as
V (wt, t) = sup
x∈A
Et
[ ∫ t+h
t
F (ws, xs)ds+ V (wt+h, t+ h)
]
(see Fleming and Soner, 2006, p. 132), that is
sup
x∈A
Et
[ ∫ t+h
t
F (ws, xs)ds+ V (wt+h, t+ h)− V (wt, t)
]
= 0 ,
and, dividing by h,
sup
x∈A
[
Et
(∫ t+h
t
F (ws, xs)ds
h
)
+ Et
(V (wt+h, t+ h)− V (wt, t)
h
)]
= 0 .
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In the hypotheses that we can use Ito’s formula for V (wt, t), namely dV (wt, t) =(
Vw(wt, t)g(xt, wt) +
1
2
Vww(wt, t)(h(wt))
2 + Vt(wt, t)
)
dt + Vw(wt, t)h(wt)dBt,
it results
supx∈A
[
Et
(∫ t+h
t F (ws,xs)ds
h
)
+Et
(∫ t+h
t
(
Vw(ws,s)g(xs,ws)+
1
2
Vww(ws,s)(h(ws))2+Vt(ws,s)
)
ds
h
)
+Et
(∫ t+h
t Vw(ws,s)h(ws)dBs
h
)]
= 0
and, if Et
( ∫ t+h
t
Vw(ws, s)h(ws)dBs
)
= 0 (as it happens, for instance, in the
case E
( ∫ t+h
t
(
Vw(ws, s)h(ws)
)2
ds
)
< +∞, for the properties of conditional
expectations and stochastic integrals, with E() the mean in the probability
space of the Brownian motion), we have
supx∈A
[
Et
(∫ t+h
t F (ws,xs)ds
h
)
+Et
(∫ t+h
t
(
Vw(ws,s)g(xs,ws)+
1
2
Vww(ws,s)(h(ws))2+Vt(ws,s)
)
ds
h
)]
= 0 .
In the hypotheses that we can take the limit, for h→ 0+, under the supremum
and the conditional expectation, it results
sup
x∈A
[
Et
(
F (wt, xt)
)
+Et
(
Vw(wt, t)g(xt, wt)+
1
2
Vww(wt, t)(h(wt))
2+Vt(wt, t)
)]
= 0 ,
that is
sup
x∈A
[
F (wt, xt) + Vw(wt, t)g(xt, wt) +
1
2
Vww(wt, t)(h(wt))
2 + Vt(wt, t)
]
= 0 .
Therefore, the HJB equation for our stochastic control problem is
sup
x (with 0≤x≤w)
[
F (w, x) + Vw(w, t)g(x,w) +
1
2
Vww(w, t)(h(w))
2 + Vt(w, t)
]
= 0 .
We can also assume, by definition of V , the (terminal) condition at time T
V (w, T ) = 0 .
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3.2 Solution of the paradox on risk neutrality
Let us consider the static and deterministic model in Chapter 1. Slightly
weakening the hypotheses on the utility U (in order to consider the linear
case), we can assume {
U(y1) = ky1 ,
C(y2, θ, α) = 0 ,
with k > 0. Namely, the taxpayer has linear utility (that describes risk neu-
trality). Being the confidence identically zero, this case can also be described
within the classical models of (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) and (Yitzhaki,
1974) (weakening the hypotheses on U).
In particular, let us assume pf = 1. In this case, the expected well-being
takes the form
(1− p)k(W − θX) + pk(W − θX − fθ(W −X) ) = (1− θ)kW ,
that is independent of X. For this reason, in this case all the choices of
declared income X ∈ [0,W ] are equivalent for the taxpayer. Namely, there
is a paradoxical situation in which the risk neutral taxpayer, in this case,
has no criteria for choosing (we have already outlined this paradox in the
conclusions of the previous chapter).
In order to solve the paradox, we put the choice of the taxpayer in a dy-
namical context with the presence of public investments, considering the
(deterministic) control problem
sup
xt (with 0≤xt≤wt)
∫ 1
0
F (wt, xt)dt ,
dwt = [m+ c ln(1 +
xt
wt
)]dt ,
with
F (wt, xt) = (1− p)k(wt − θxt) + pk(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) ) = (1− θ)kwt ,
c > 0, w0 > 0, m > −w0. This is a deterministic case (weakening the
hypotheses on U) of the general control model that we have described in
Section 3.1. The function c ln(1 + xt
wt
), in the deterministic differential law,
expresses the effect of public investments on the trend of the income (to be
more precise, it is an indirect effect, expressing that the taxpayer is motivated
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to declare his or her income by the (expected) positive effect of public invest-
ments). The constant m expresses the other factors that drive the expected
trend of the income.
It is easy to see that the solution of the problem is xt = wt, for all t ∈ [0, 1]
(because this choice of the control function xt maximizes the state function
wt, see the elementary comparison result in Appendix A.3, and in this case
the expected well-being F is (strictly) increasing with respect to wt). The
economic interpretation is that, now, the choices are not equivalent, because
the taxpayer takes into account the effect of public investments.
We can also complete the analytical study of the problem, considering the
value function
V (wt, t) =
∫ 1
t
(1− p)k(ws − θws) + pk(ws − θws − fθ(ws − ws) )ds
=
∫ 1
t
k(1− θ)wsds .
The income takes the form wt = w0 + [m + c ln(2)]t (due to its differential
law, with xt = wt), with primitive function w0t +
m+c ln(2)
2
t2. Thus we can
write the value function as
V (wt, t) = k(1− θ)
[
w0 +
m+ c ln(2)
2
− w0t− m+ c ln(2)
2
t2
]
,
that is, with w0 = wt − [m+ c ln(2)]t,
V (wt, t) = k(1− θ)
[
wt(1− t) + m+ c ln(2)
2
(1− t)2
]
.
It is easy to see that it is solution of the HJB equation
Vt(w, t) + Vw(w, t)[m+ c ln(2)] + k(1− θ)w = 0 ,
with the terminal condition
V (w, 1) = 0 .
3.3 Models with investment coefficients
Let us consider a particular case of the general model that we have seen in
Section 3.1, with utility of income and confidence function of the form
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{
U(y1) = a ln(y1) ,
C(y2, θ, α) = b
α
θ
ln(l + y2) ,
and with {
g(xt, wt) = [m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]wt ,
h(wt) = σwt ,
where
yt = (1− p)(wt − θxt) + p(wt − θxt − fθ(wt − xt) )
(with the meaning of the previous chapter. We assume for p, f , α, θ the
same hypotheses of Section 3.1). In this case, the expected well-being can
be expressed by
F (wt, xt) = (1−p)a ln(wt−θxt)+pa ln(wt−θxt−fθ(wt−xt) )+bα
θ
ln(l+xt) .
In this way, we have defined the class (varying the parameters a > 0, b ≥ 0,
m, c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, σ 6= 0, l > 0, w0 > 0) of stochastic control problems
sup
x∈A
E0
(∫ T
0
F (wt, xt)dt
)
,
dwt =
[
m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]
wtdt+ σwtdBt , (3.2)
with initial value w0 > 0.
Notice that the assumptions of Section 1.1, on U and C, are verified. The
constant l occurs in the confidence function for technical reasons. It can also
be chosen very small, for instance l = 10−6.
The function c1
xt
wt
expresses the effect of public investments on the trend of
the income (as we have seen before, it is an indirect effect, expressing that
the taxpayer is motivated to declare his or her income by the (expected)
positive effect of public investments). The function c2
yt
wt
expresses the effect
of private investments on the trend of the income (the effect is linked to the
effective income, through yt). We can indicate the weights c1, c2, respectively,
as public and private investment coefficients. The constant m expresses the
other factors that drive the expected trend of the income. We have chosen
the linear form for the investments, but also other functional forms can be
chosen (for instance, the logarithmic form c1 ln(1 +
xt
wt
), c2 ln(1 +
yt
wt
) models
decreasing marginal effectiveness of the investments, and the results of the
following analysis hold also with this choice).
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3.3.1 Analysis of the (rewritten) models
In order to study the analytical properties, in the following we rewrite the
model with investment coefficients with a transformation of variables. In
this way we can bring back the problem to classical theorems of stochastic
control. In particular we demonstrate that the HJB equation has solution,
unique in a space of polynomial growth functions, and this solution, under
suitable hypotheses, is equal to the value function.
Let us consider the transformation of variables{
zt =
xt
wt
,
vt = ln(wt) .
(3.3)
The expected well-being becomes
G(vt, zt) = F (e
vt , zte
vt)
= (1−p)a ln(evt−θztevt)+pa ln( evt−θztevt−fθ(evt−ztevt) )+bα
θ
ln(l+zte
vt)
= (1−p)a[vt+ln(1−θzt)]+pa[vt+ln( 1−θzt−fθ(1−zt) )]+bα
θ
ln(l+zte
vt) .
Applying Ito’s formula, we obtain
dvt = d ln(wt) =
1
wt
[m+ c1
xt
wt
+ c2
yt
wt
]wtdt− 1
2
1
w2t
σ2w2t dt+
1
wt
σwtdBt
= [m+ c1zt + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2]dt+ σdBt ,
with
yt = (1− p)(evt − θztevt) + p( evt − θztevt − fθ(evt − ztevt) ) .
Let us observe that we used Ito’s formula without the hypotheses of Ito’s
lemma (because the logarithmic function is defined only on positive num-
bers). But if a process vt verifies this stochastic differential law, then e
vt
verifies the law (3.2) (indeed, this time we can apply Ito’s lemma, because
the exponential function is defined on the whole R).
By using the transformation of variables (3.3), therefore, the stochastic con-
trol problem becomes
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supz∈A′ E0
( ∫ T
0
G(vt, zt)dt
)
,
dvt = [m+ c1zt + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2]dt+ σdBt ,
(3.4)
where A′ is the set of the admissible controls, defined as
A′ =

z(t, ω) : [0, T ]× Ω→ R such that :
1) zt(ω) ismeasurablewith respect toFt andB(R), for all t.
2)There exists aMarkov process v solution of the stochastic
differential law, pathwise unique.
3) 0 ≤ zt ≤ 1 (in [0, T ]× Ω).
4)E0
( ∫ T
0
G(vt, zt)dt
)
exists.
5) z is progressively measurable.

(for technical reasons, now we require that the admissible controls are pro-
gressively measurable).
The value function of the problem is
R(vt, t) = sup
z∈A′
Et
(∫ T
t
G(vs, zs)ds
)
,
and the related HJB equation is
supz (with 0≤z≤1)
[
G(v, z) +Rv(v, t)[m+ c1z + c2
y
ev
− 1
2
σ2]
+1
2
Rvv(v, t)σ
2 +Rt(v, t)
]
= 0 ,
(3.5)
with terminal condition
R(v, T ) = 0 . (3.6)
The following theorem summarizes some important properties related to the
HJB equation and to the solution of the stochastic control problem.
Theorem 1.
1. There exists a solution R(v, t) of the HJB equation (3.5) (with terminal
condition (3.6) ), unique in the space of functions C2,1(R × [0, T ]) ∩
Cp(R × [0, T ]) (Cp(R × [0, T ]) is the set of continuous functions φ on
R× [0, T ], satisfying the polynomial growth condition |φ(v, t)| ≤ k(1 +
|v|h) for some constants k, h).
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2. We have, for all v, t,
R(v, t) ≥ R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is greater than or equal to
the value function).
Furthermore, if there exists an admissible control process zt that (for
almost all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω) maximizes
G(vt, z) +Rv(vt, t)[m+ c1z + c2
yt
evt
− 1
2
σ2]
(with yt = (1− p)(evt − θzevt) + p( evt − θzevt − fθ(evt − zevt) ) and vt
the state process related to zt), then, for all v, t,
R(v, t) = R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is equal to the value function)
and zt is an optimal control process.
Proof. In order to demonstrate the first part of the theorem, let us observe
that the model (3.4) verifies the hypotheses of an existence theorem for the
solutions of the HJB equation, with uniqueness in the space of (polynomial
growth) functions C2,1(R× [0, T ]) ∩ Cp(R× [0, T ]) (see Appendix A.4, The-
orem 4). About the hypotheses, in particular, we can observe that the HJB
equation is uniformly parabolic (because σ2 > 0), G, Gv have polynomial
growth (with respect to v and z), and the control processes have values in a
compact set ( [0, 1] ).
The second part follows from a verification theorem (see Appendix A.4, The-
orem 3).
In order to express the (stochastic) total income XTot that the taxpayer
expects to declare, and the related (stochastic) total income WTot, we can
consider the following equalities
XTot =
∫ T
0
zte
vtdt ,
WTot =
∫ T
0
evtdt ,
obtained inverting the transformation of variables (3.3), with zt optimal con-
trol process for the problem (3.4), and vt the related state process.
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3.3.2 Computational example
In the following example we assign values to the parameters of the (rewritten)
model (for simplicity, in the case with null confidence). Solving the stochastic
control problem (3.4) and using a Monte Carlo method, the mean and the
variance of XTot are estimated.
Let us assume
p = 0.15 , f = 1.8 , θ = 0.45 , w0 = 1 , a = 1 , b = 0 ,
m = 0.2 , c1 = 0.5 , c2 = 0.5 , σ = 1 , T = 1 .
With a suitable algorithm, the maximization problem in the HJB equation
(3.5) is solved and the value function (as a solution of the corresponding
partial differential equation, numerically solved) is estimated (see figure 3.1).
Then the algorithm simulates 10×n random variables with standard normal
distribution and it determines n (discretized) paths of vt (each consisting of 10
values in equally spaced times, from t = 0.1 to t = 1), with the corresponding
n paths of xt. For each path of xt it determines, with numerical integration,
the corresponding XTot. Finally, with a Monte Carlo method, the algorithm
calculates (as in the examples of the previous chapter) the estimator M =∑n
j=1XTotj
n
for the mean of XTot, the estimator S
2 =
(
∑n
j=1X
2
Totj
)−nM2
n−1 for
the variance and an approximate confidence interval (at the level of 95%)
I =
[
M − 1.96
√
S2
n
,M + 1.96
√
S2
n
]
.
The code of the algorithm is contained in the attachments 1 and 2 (with an
introduction in Appendix C).
Executing the algorithm with n = 104 simulations of paths, it was obtained
M = 0.182709 , S2 = 0.00541982 , I = [0.181266, 0.184152] .
Varying the parameters of the problem, the following tables were obtained.
In the first table there are the values of the estimated mean M , varying a
and c1.
c1 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25
a
1 0.000 0.183 0.553 0.954 1.325
1.5 0.000 0.183 0.560 0.947 1.303
We can observe that, increasing the coefficient of public investment c1, the
(expected) total declared income tends to increase (in both cases a = 1 and
a = 1.5).
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Figure 3.1: The value function V (v, t).
In the second table there are the values of the estimated mean M , varying p
and f .
f 1.6 1.7 1.8
p
0.14 0.030 0.072 0.146
0.15 0.045 0.097 0.183
0.16 0.063 0.125 0.224
As we can see, increasing the probability of being discovered p or the fine f ,
the (expected) total declared income tends to increase.
In the third table there are the values of the estimated mean M , varying p
and c2.
c2 0.25 0.5 0.75
p
0.14 0.237 0.146 0.064
0.15 0.274 0.183 0.097
0.16 0.315 0.224 0.136
We can observe that the (expected) total declared income tends to increase
as the probability of being discovered p increases. On the other hand, the
(expected) total declared income tends to decrease as the coefficient of private
investment c2 increases.
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In the fourth table there are the values of the estimated mean M , varying σ
and θ.
θ 0.35 0.4 0.45
σ
1 0.290 0.189 0.183
1.5 0.289 0.190 0.184
2 0.290 0.191 0.183
As we can see, increasing the tax rate θ, the (expected) total declared income
tends to decrease. Furthermore, varying σ, the (expected) total declared
income seems to stay rather stable.
In the fifth table there are the values of the estimated variance S2, varying
w0 and σ.
σ 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
w0
1 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.023 0.033
e
1
2 0.015 0.027 0.046 0.060 0.094
We can observe that, increasing the constant σ, the variance of the total
declared income tends to increase (in both cases w0 = 1 and w0 = e
1
2 ).
3.4 Conclusions of this chapter
In this chapter we propose a general stochastic control model on the ex-
pectations of a taxpayer (or, in an alternative interpretation, forecasting the
taxpayer’s behavior), in which the dynamics of income are driven by economic
factors linked to declared income (like public and private investments) and
by sources of uncertainty. As a particular case (weakening the hypotheses
on U), we consider a model that allows to solve a paradox in the taxpayer’s
choice with risk neutrality. Then we consider a class of models with public
and private investment coefficients, that we study in their analytical proper-
ties with a suitable transformation of variables, offering also a computational
example.
Some developments can regard the deepening of the mathematical prop-
erties of the models (for instance, in the case of models with investment
coefficients, the possibility of using constant relative risk aversion utilities,
different from the logarithmic function). Other developments can regard the
use of these models as part of general equilibrium models.
Furthermore, the parameters can be calibrated with real data, also in order
to check the effectiveness of the model results.
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Conclusions
In Chapter 1 we propose a static model on tax evasion with confidence in
institutions. Thanks to the confidence function added to the utility of income,
the taxpayer may choose tax compliance even in case of convenient gamble.
Furthermore, an increase in tax rate may lead to an increase in tax evasion,
therefore this model proposes a solution to Yitzhaki’s paradox. Within our
model we can also describe different types of taxpayers.
Then, in Chapter 2 we present two models (the first in discrete time,
the second in continuous time) on the taxpayer’s expectations (or, in an
alternative interpretation, forecasting the taxpayer’s behavior).
We study the cases of only one choice, n discrete time choices, and continuous
time choices, also under the additional assumption of inflation.
The structure of these two models allows us to study their solutions relying
on the static model of the previous chapter. We show various examples in
which, using Monte Carlo methods, the models are studied under hypothe-
ses of probability distribution for the stochastic variables representing the
parameters.
Finally, in Chapter 3 we propose a stochastic control model that extends
the previous models, taking into account dynamics of public and private
investments.
By using the dynamic programming principle, we heuristically derive the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the general model. Then we pass to
examine two particular cases. The first, in a deterministic framework, solves
a paradox (that arises in a static model with linear utility and identically
zero confidence function) for the risk neutral taxpayer. In the second case,
specifying the form of the investment functions, we analytically study the
links between the value function of the (rewritten) problem and an exist-
ing solution of the HJB equation, and we use these properties to solve the
stochastic control problem with a numerical algorithm.
All the three chapters present a conclusions section, where the possible
developments of the models are discussed. More in general, these models can
be extended in their economic features and deepened in their mathematical
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properties. They can also be part of a general equilibrium model. In order
to verify assumptions and results of our models, they can be compared with
data and results of empirical studies (see also, in Appendix B, a verification
project for the assumptions of the static model).
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Appendix A
Specifications on the models
A.1 Hypothesis on f
The hypothesis f < 1
θ
ensures that even if the evader is discovered his or her
effective income Z remains positive (in this way we avoid dealing with the
utility of negative amounts, with respect to which the hypothesis of concavity
is problematic). Indeed (since 0 < θ < 1, W > 0 and 0 ≤ X ≤ W ) we have
−θX ≥ −X
and
−fθ(W −X) ≥ −(W −X)
(where at least one of the two inequalities is strict), therefore
Z = W − θX − fθ(W −X) > W −X − (W −X) = 0 .
The hypothesis is also necessary to have Z > 0 for all X. Indeed if we
assume f ≥ 1
θ
, for X = 0 we have
Z = W − θX − fθ(W −X) = W − fθW = (1− fθ)W ≤ 0 .
A.2 Derivative of X with respect to θ
Theorem 2. Let X be the interior solution that maximizes E[B] for a certain
value θ̂ of the tax rate (fixed the other parameters). Then there exists a
neighbourhood I of θ̂ in which the maximization problem still admits interior
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solution (thus defining the maximum function X(θ) in I) and, furthermore,
the maximum function is continuously differentiable and one has (1.11).
Proof. Let us consider the function of θ,X defined by the first order condition
(1.4). Thanks to the regularity of the functions and to the sign of the second
order condition (1.5), the assumptions of the implicit function theorem are
satisfied in the point (θ̂, X). Thus there exists, continuously differentiable,
the implicit function X(θ) in a suitable neighbourhood I of θ̂. Choosing
I suitably small (so that the function X(θ), by continuity, takes values in
]0,W [ ), X(θ) is the maximum function sought.
Notice that the implicit function theorem gives directly the form of ∂X
∂θ
.
Nevertheless here we get it explicitly. Let us observe that the points (θ,X(θ))
meet the first order condition, also in the equivalent form (1.10). Therefore
the left-hand side of (1.10), for X = X(θ), is a constant function (equal to
0) of θ in I, then it has null derivative. Differentiating the left-hand side of
(1.10) with respect to θ and setting
Y = W − θX ,
Z = W − θX − fθ(W −X) ,
we obtain
(1−p)
(
−X−θ∂X
∂θ
)
U ′′(Y )+(1−f)p
(
−X−θ∂X
∂θ
−f(W−X)+fθ∂X
∂θ
)
U ′′(Z)
+
−θ
(
Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
∂X
∂θ
+ Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
)
+ Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
= 0 ,
that is equivalent to
∂X
∂θ
(
(p− 1)θU ′′(Y ) + (f − 1)pθU ′′(Z)− f(f − 1)pθU ′′(Z)− Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
θ
)
+(p− 1)XU ′′(Y ) + (f − 1)pXU ′′(Z) + f(f − 1)p(W −X)U ′′(Z)
−Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
θ
+
Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
= 0 ,
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that is
∂X
∂θ
(
(p− 1)θU ′′(Y ) + pθ(f − 1− f 2 + f)U ′′(Z)− Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
θ
)
= −X
(
(p− 1)U ′′(Y ) + (f − 1)pU ′′(Z)
)
− f(f − 1)p(W −X)U ′′(Z)+
+
Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
θ
− Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
.
Recalling that the amount
D = θ2(1− p)U ′′(Y ) + θ2p(f − 1)2U ′′(Z) + Cy2y2(X, θ, α)
is non-zero (being the first member of the second order condition), we obtain
(1.11)
∂X
∂θ
=
−θ
D
[
X
(
(1− p)U ′′(Y )− p(f − 1)U ′′(Z)
)
− pf(f − 1)(W −X)U ′′(Z)+
+
Cy2θ(X, θ, α)
θ
− Cy2(X, θ, α)
θ2
]
.
A.3 An elementary comparison result
We use this comparison result in the optimal choice of Section 4.2. The proof
is very easy, and we report it only for completeness.
Proposition 4. Consider F,G : [0, 1] → R, and φ, ψ : [0, 1] → R solutions
(respectively) of dφ = F (t)dt, dψ = G(t)dt, with φ(0) = ψ(0). If F (t) ≥ G(t)
for all t ∈ [0, 1], then φ(t) ≥ ψ(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. We have, for all t ∈ [0, 1],
φ(t) = φ(0) + φ(t)− φ(0) = φ(0) +
∫ t
0
F (s)ds
≥ ψ(0) +
∫ t
0
G(s)ds = ψ(0) + ψ(t)− ψ(0) = ψ(t) .
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A.4 Stochastic control theorems
The following verification theorem is a particular case of Theorem 3.1 in
Fleming and Soner, 2006, p. 157. We use a different notation, similar to
that used in our model.
Let U be a compact subset of R. Let f(v, t, z) be a real function of class
C0(R×[0, T ]×U)∩C1(R×[0, T ]), σ(v, t) a real function of class C1(R×[0, T ]),
G(v, t, z) a real function of class C0(R× [0, T ]× U).
Let us suppose that:
1. There exists a real constant C1 such that |ft|+|fv| ≤ C1, |σt|+|σv| ≤ C1,
|f(v, t, z)| ≤ C1(1 + |v|+ |z|), |σ(v, t)| ≤ C1(1 + |v|).
2. There exist real constants C2, k such that |G(v, t, z)| ≤ C2(1+|v|k+|z|k)
(polynomial growth condition).
Let us consider the stochastic control problem, in the form of a value function,
R(vt, t) = sup
z∈A′
Et
(∫ T
t
G(vs, t, zs)ds
)
,
dvt = f(v, t, z)dt+ σ(v, t)dBt ,
with initial value v0, Bt a Brownian motion in a probability space (Ω,F , P )
with filtration {Ft}, A′ the set of admissible controls (namely the progres-
sively measurable processes zt with values in U), associated HJB equation
sup
z∈U
[
G(v, t, z) +Rv(v, t)f(v, t, z) +
1
2
Rvv(v, t)σ
2(v, t) +Rt(v, t)
]
= 0
with terminal condition R(v, T ) = 0.
Let Cp(R×[0, T ]) be the set of continuous functions φ on R×[0, T ], satisfying
the polynomial growth condition |φ(v, t)| ≤ k(1+|v|h) for some real constants
k, h.
Theorem 3. If the HJB equation has a solution R(v, t) in the space of func-
tions C2,1(R× [0, T ]) ∩ Cp(R× [0, T ]), then, for all v, t,
R(v, t) ≥ R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is greater than or equal to the
value function).
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Furthermore, if there exists an admissible control process zt that (for almost
all (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω) maximizes G(vt, t, z) + Rv(vt, t)f(vt, t, z) (vt is the
state process related to zt), then, for all v, t,
R(v, t) = R(v, t)
(namely, the solution of the HJB equation is equal to the value function) and
zt is an optimal control process.
The following theorem of existence and uniqueness is a particular case
of Theorem 4.3 in Fleming and Soner, 2006, p. 163 (see also Theorem 6.2
in Fleming and Rishel, 1975, p.169). Also in this case we use a different
notation, similar to that used in our model.
Theorem 4. Let us consider the equation (of the HJB type)
sup
z∈U
[
G(v, t, z) +Rv(v, t)f(v, t, z) +
1
2
Rvv(v, t)σ
2(v, t) +Rt(v, t)
]
= 0 , (A.1)
with terminal condition R(v, T ) = 0, where G is a real function of class C1
in R× [0, T ]×U , U is a compact subset of R, f is a real function defined in
R× [0, T ]× U , σ is a real function of class C2,1 in R× [0, T ].
Let us suppose that:
1. There exists c > 0 such that σ2(v, t) ≥ c for all v, t (condition of
uniformly parabolic HJB equation).
2. f(v, t, z) = σ(v, t)Ψ(v, t, z) with Ψ a real function of class C1 in R ×
[0, T ]× U and Ψ,Ψv bounded.
3. σ, 1
σ
, σv are bounded.
4. G,Gv have polynomial growth with respect to v and z.
Then, there exists a solution R(v, t) of (A.1), unique in the space of functions
C2,1(R× [0, T ]) ∩ Cp(R× [0, T ]).
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Appendix B
A verification project for the
assumptions of the static model
The static model of Chapter 1 (on tax evasion and confidence in institutions)
assumes some hypotheses that are original compared to the reference litera-
ture. We wish to submit these assumptions to qualitative and quantitative
analysis, in order to understand if they can have an empirical evidence. In
particular, in the following are listed three hypotheses to test.
1) For all y2, θ, α we have
Cy2(y2, θ, α) ≥ 0 ,
namely, the confidence function is monotonically non-decreasing with respect
to declared income.
2) There exists θ ∈ [0, 1
f
[ such that for all θ > θ (and for all y2, α) we have
Cy2θ(y2, θ, α) ≤ 0 ,
that is, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-
increasing with respect to θ, at least above θ.
3) For all y2, θ, α we have
Cy2α(y2, θ, α) ≥ 0 ,
that is, the marginal confidence of declared income is monotonically non-
decreasing with respect to α.
We propose a verification project for these assumptions, based on inter-
views (in order to have case studies, that allow to know the dynamics of the
taxpayer’s choices) and questionnaires (in order to conduct an econometric
analysis).
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The use of mixed methods (see Creswell, 2013), based on qualitative and
quantitative analysis, allows to study different aspects of the phenomenon,
and the results can be integrated in order to have a more complete perspective
on the reliability of the hypotheses.
B.1 Interviews (qualitative verification)
In order to understand in depth the meanings linked to the concept of con-
fidence (trust in institutions, social responsibility, utility of contributing to
the collective welfare) and the connections between tax compliance, tax rate
and (perceived) effectiveness of public expenditure, we can use interviews as
qualitative methods to open the black box. The interviews can be structured
(namely, in each interview there are the same questions), with open-ended
answers.
For instance, we can interview 5 people, among entrepreneurs and profes-
sionals, with small, medium or large businesses (varying could be better).
The interview can be composed of 3 open questions like:
1. If the institutions are trustworthy, can paying taxes be (as well as a
duty imposed by law) a way of contributing to the collective welfare?
Why?
2. When are taxes too high or unfair?
3. When services work better, are taxes more gladly paid, or this aspect
is unimportant? Why?
B.2 Questionnaires (quantitative verification)
In order to verify statistically the hypotheses of the static model on tax
evasion and confidence in institutions, we can collect data with a survey
based on questionnaires.
It should be proposed to a statistical sample of taxpayers. The key questions,
with 3 closed-ended and ordered answers, could be:
1. Do you think that one can feel himself or herself useful paying taxes,
as a contribution to the collective welfare? [Highly, a little, in no way].
2. This feeling of ‘being useful’ is negatively affected, when one perceives
that taxes are too high? [Highly, a little, in no way].
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3. This feeling of ‘being useful’ is positively affected, when one perceives
that the public expenditure achieves good outcomes? [Highly, a little,
in no way].
The sample selection, the way to propose and implement the questionnaire,
its structure, the additional questions, and the other technical requirements,
can be chosen according to suitability and resources.
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Appendix C
Code of the algorithm in
Section 3.3.2
The attachments 1 and 2 contain, respectively, the first and the second part
of the code of the algorithm used in Section 3.3.2. It was implemented and
executed in Mathematica 10.3.
The first part of the code (see Attachment 1) solves, with symbolic cal-
culus, the maximization problem in the HJB equation (3.5).
In the second part of the algorithm (see Attachment 2), the partial differ-
ential equation (obtained substituting the maximum function of the previous
part in the HJB equation) is numerically solved. The solution constitutes an
estimate of the value function (the algorithm offers also the graph in figure
3.1). Then 10 × n random variables with standard normal distribution are
simulated (with n = 104), in order to determine n (discretized) paths of vt
(each consisting of 10 values in equally spaced times, from t = 0.1 to t = 1),
with the corresponding n paths of xt. For each path of xt the algorithm deter-
mines, with numerical integration (trapezoidal rule), the corresponding XTot.
Finally, with a Monte Carlo method, the algorithm calculates the estimator
M =
∑n
j=1XTotj
n
for the mean of XTot, the estimator S
2 =
(
∑n
j=1X
2
Totj
)−nM2
n−1
for the variance of XTot, an approximate confidence interval (at the level of
95%) I =
[
M − 1.96
√
S2
n
,M + 1.96
√
S2
n
]
for XTot, and a histogram of its
values. The algorithm calculates also the estimator MW =
∑n
j=1WTotj
n
for the
mean of WTot.
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In[27]:= h[z_, f_, p_, theta_, a_] :=1 - p * a * Log[1 - theta * z] + p * a * Log1 - theta * z - f * theta 1 - z;
l[z_, j_, f_, p_, theta_, a_, c1_, c2_] := h[z, f, p, theta, a] +
j * c1 * z + c2 * 1 - p * (-theta * z) + c2 * p * (-theta * z) + c2 * p * f * theta * z;
D[l[z, j, f, p, theta, a, c1, c2], z]
Out[29]= j (c1 - c2 (1 - p) theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta) -
a (1 - p) theta
1 - theta z + a p (-theta + f theta)1 - f theta (1 - z) - theta z
In[30]:= derivata[z_, j_, f_, p_, theta_, a_, c1_, c2_] :=
j c1 - c2 1 - p theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta -
a 1 - p theta
1 - theta z + a p (-theta + f theta)1 - f theta 1 - z - theta z ;
In[31]:= Solve[derivata[z, j, f, p, theta, a, c1, c2] ⩵ 0, z]
Out[31]= z → -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -
c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 -2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta -
a theta2 + a f theta2 - 2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 +
2 c2 f j p theta2 - c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3,z → -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 +
c2 f2 j p theta2 - c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 +2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta - a theta2 + a f theta2 -
2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 + 2 c2 f j p theta2 -
c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3
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In[32]:= derivata[0, j, f, p, theta, a, c1, c2]
derivata[1, j, f, p, theta, a, c1, c2]
Out[32]= -a (1 - p) theta + a p (-theta + f theta)
1 - f theta + j (c1 - c2 (1 - p) theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta)
Out[33]= - a (1 - p) theta
1 - theta + a p (-theta + f theta)1 - theta + j (c1 - c2 (1 - p) theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta)
In[34]:= derivata0[j_] := -a 1 - p theta +
a p (-theta + f theta)
1 - f theta + j c1 - c2 1 - p theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta;
derivata1[j_] := - a 1 - p theta1 - theta + a p (-theta + f theta)1 - theta +
j c1 - c2 1 - p theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta;
In[36]:= z1[j_] := -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 +
2 c2 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -
c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 -2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta -
a theta2 + a f theta2 - 2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 +
2 c2 f j p theta2 - c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3;
z2[j_] := -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -
c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 +2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta -
a theta2 + a f theta2 - 2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 +
2 c2 f j p theta2 - c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3;
In[38]:=
zetamassimo[j_] := Piecewise[{{0, derivata0[j] ≤ 0},{1, derivata1[j] ≥ 0}, {z1[j], 0 < z1[j] < 1}, {z2[j], 0 < z2[j] < 1}}]
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f = 1.8;
p = 0.15;
theta = 9  20;
v0 = 0;
a = 1;
c1 = 0.5;
c2 = 0.5;
m = 0.2;
s = 1;
n = 10^4;
zetamassimo[j_] := Piecewise0, -a 1 - p theta + a p (-theta + f theta)1 - f theta +
j c1 - c2 1 - p theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta ≤ 0, 1, - a 1 - p theta1 - theta +
a p (-theta + f theta)
1 - theta + j c1 - c2 1 - p theta - c2 p theta + c2 f p theta ≥ 0,-2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 -
c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 - c2 f j theta3 +
c2 f2 j p theta3 -2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta - a theta2 + a f theta2 -
2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 + 2 c2 f j p theta2 -
c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f
j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3,
0 < -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -
c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 -2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta - a theta2 + a
f theta2 - 2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 + 2 c2 f j
p theta2 - c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta - a
f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f
j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 < 1,-2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 +
c2 f2 j p theta2 - c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 +2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta - a theta2 + a f theta2 -
2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 + c2 f j theta2 + 2 c2 f j p theta2 -
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c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j p theta32 -
4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta - c2 f j p theta -
a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f
j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 - c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3,
0 < -2 c1 j theta + c1 f j theta + a theta2 - a f theta2 + 2 c2 j theta2 +
c1 f j theta2 - c2 f j theta2 - 2 c2 f j p theta2 +
c2 f2 j p theta2 - c2 f j theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 +2 c1 j theta - c1 f j theta - a theta2 + a f theta2 - 2 c2 j theta2 - c1 f j theta2 +
c2 f j theta2 + 2 c2 f j p theta2 - c2 f2 j p theta2 + c2 f j theta3 - c2 f2 j
p theta32 - 4 -c1 j + a theta + c2 j theta + c1 f j theta - a f p theta -
c2 f j p theta - a f theta2 - c2 f j theta2 + a f p theta2 + c2 f2 j p theta2-c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 2 -c1 j theta2 + c1 f j theta2 + c2 j theta3 - c2 f j theta3 -
c2 f j p theta3 + c2 f2 j p theta3 < 1
zetamassimo[1]
0.472306
g[v_, z_] :=1 - p * a * v + Log[1 - theta * z] + p * a * v + Log1 - theta * z - f * theta 1 - z;
fval = NDSolveg[v, zetamassimo[D[valore[v, t], v]]] +
D[valore[v, t], v] * m + c1 * zetamassimo[D[valore[v, t], v]] +
c2 * 1 - p * 1 - theta * zetamassimo[D[valore[v, t], v]] +
p * 1 - theta * zetamassimo[D[valore[v, t], v]] -
f * theta 1 - zetamassimo[D[valore[v, t], v]] - 1  2 * s^2 +1  2 * D[valore[v, t], v, v] * s^2 + D[valore[v, t], t] ⩵ 0,
valore[v, 1] ⩵ 0 , valore, v,-100 * s^2,
100 * s^2, {t,
0,
1}
NDSolve::bcart :
Warning: an insufficient number of boundary conditions have been specified for the direction of independent variable 
v. Artificial boundary effects may be present in the solution. 
valore → InterpolatingFunction Domain: {{-100., 100.}, {0., 1.}}
Output: scalar

funzval[v_, t_] := Evaluate[valore[v, t] /. fval];
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Plot3Dfunzval[v, t], v, -100 * s^2, 100 * s^2,{t, 0, 1}, AxesLabel → Automatic, Filling -> Bottom
Plot3Dfunzval[v, t], v, -100 s2, 100 s2, {t, 0, 1},
PlotTheme → "Detailed", AxesLabel → Automatic, Filling → Bottom
funzval(v, t)
matv = Table[0, {j, n}, {k, 11}];
matx = Table[0, {j, n}, {k, 11}];
vetwtot = Table[0, {j, n}];
vetxtot = Table[0, {j, n}];
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aleatoria = RandomVariate[NormalDistribution[0, 1], {n, 10}];
Forj = 1, j ≤ n, j++, matv[[j, 1]] = v0;
matx[[j, 1]] = Exp[v0] *
zetamassimofunzvalv0 + 10^-6, 0[[1]] - funzval[v0, 0][[1]]  10^-6;
Fork = 2, k ≤ 11, k++, matv[[j, k]] = matv[[j, k - 1]] +m + c1 * zetamassimofunzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]] + 10^-6, 0.1 * k - 2[[1]] -
funzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]], 0.1 * k - 2[[1]]  10^-6 +
c2 * 1 - p * 1 - theta * zetamassimofunzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]] + 10^-6,
0.1 * k - 2[[1]] - funzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]], 0.1 * k - 2[[
1]]  10^-6 + p * 1 - theta * zetamassimofunzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]] + 10^-6, 0.1 * k - 2[[1]] - funzval
matv[[j, k - 1]], 0.1 * k - 2[[1]]  10^-6 - f * theta 1 -
zetamassimofunzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]] + 10^-6, 0.1 * k - 2[[1]] -
funzvalmatv[[j, k - 1]], 0.1 * k - 2[[1]]  10^-6 -1  2 * s^2 * 0.1 + s * aleatoria[[j, k - 1]] * Sqrt[0.1];
matx[[j, k]] = Exp[matv[[j, k]]] * zetamassimofunzvalmatv[[j, k]] + 10^-6, 0.1 * k - 1[[1]] -
funzvalmatv[[j, k]], 0.1 * k - 1[[1]]  10^-6;(* We use the trapezoidal rule *)
Forj = 1, j ≤ n, j++,
vetwtot[[j]] = 1  10 * Exp[matv[[j, 1]]] + Exp[matv[[j, 11]]]  2 +
Sum[Exp[matv[[j, k]]], {k, 2, 10}];
mediawtot = Sum[vetwtot[[j]], {j, 1, n}]  n
Forj = 1, j ≤ n, j++, vetxtot[[j]] =1  10 * matx[[j, 1]] + matx[[j, 11]]  2 + Sum[matx[[j, k]], {k, 2, 10}];
mediaxtot = Sum[vetxtot[[j]], {j, 1, n}]  n
varianza = 1  n - 1 * Sum[(vetxtot[[j]])^2, {j, 1, n}] - n * (mediaxtot)^2
confidenza ={mediaxtot - 1.96 * Sqrt[(varianza) / (n)], mediaxtot + 1.96 * Sqrt[(varianza) / (n)]}
Show[Histogram[vetxtot, 20, "ProbabilityDensity"]]
1.47137
0.182709
0.00541982
{0.181266, 0.184152}
4     Attachment_2.nb
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
Attachment_2.nb     5
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
